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introduCtion
The regulation of armed non-state actors is a challenge to the state-centric international law paradigm. The vast majority of international legal instruments which impact 
the regulation of armed actors are open to ratification by states 
only. This leads to the unfortunate situation in which armed non-
state actors often fall outside the remit of international law and 
their use of force and, indeed, the use of force against them, is 
left unregulated, which can only be to the detriment of combat-
ants and civilians alike. However, there is an emerging trend, 
led by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Geneva 
Call, to accommodate non-state actors under the international 
humanitarian law (IHL) framework.
This article seeks to investigate how non-state actors, specifi-
cally national liberation movements, are and could be regulated 
by IHL. It seeks to give an overview of the relevant legal provi-
sions and illustrates the difficulties faced by national liberation 
movements if they do wish to accede to IHL instruments and 
apply IHL in their conflicts. As it is the aim of IHL to protect 
both combatants and civilians in armed conflicts, it is important 
that this body of law is practically applied and implemented in 
all conflict situations to the greatest extent possible. However, 
in the past, national liberation movements have encountered 
difficulties when seeking to apply IHL to their conflicts due 
to the nature of the legal framework and, indeed, the nature of 
international law itself.
International law, the body of law that governs states in their 
relationships with one another, generally struggles to accom-
modate non-state actors. The international legal instruments 
dealing with the laws of war, namely the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949,1 the Hague Regulations of 1907,2 and more modern 
international conventions seeking to regulate weapons such as 
the Ottawa Treaty of 1997 banning landmines,3 were all drafted 
by states with the regulation of states in mind. These instruments 
almost exclusively limit ratification to states and do not allow 
for the accession of non-states. This means that non-state actors, 
including national liberation movements, face many difficulties 
when seeking to be bound by and apply IHL provisions in their 
conflicts, thus limiting the protection available to those fighting 
and caught up in these conflicts. However, non-state actors are 
active in various theatres of war and it is therefore vital that a 
realistic IHL framework that accommodates non-state actors be 
formulated.
* Dr. Noelle Higgins is a lecturer in International Law in the School 
of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Ireland.
The Regulation of Armed Non-State Actors: Promoting the Application of the 
Laws of War to Conflicts Involving National Liberation Movements
by Noelle Higgins*
Wars oF national liberation
A war of national liberation can be defined as “the armed 
struggle waged by a people through its liberation movement 
against the established government to reach self-determina-
tion.”4 The right to self-determination has been enshrined in 
conventional law in various legal provisions, such as Article 1 
and Article 55 of the UN Charter,5 and Common Article 1 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights6 and 
the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural 
Rights.7 This right is also a jus cogens norm, binding on all 
states, as recognized by the International Court of Justice.8 
Nevertheless, because it is very difficult to implement, the right 
of a people to self-determination often goes ignored or is denied. 
In many cases this denial encourages the creation of national lib-
eration movements and the outbreak of wars aimed at challeng-
ing governmental authority and achieving self-determination 
through force.
The main spate of wars of national liberation occurred in 
the mid-twentieth century; however, wars of national libera-
tion did not vanish completely after the decolonization period. 
In fact, according to the report Peace and Conflict 2008, 26 
armed self-determination conflicts were ongoing as of late 2006, 
including conflicts waged by groups representing the Palestinian 
people, the Corsicans in France, and the Chechens in Russia.9 
Additionally, in 2008 the South Ossetians, with support from 
Russia, declared independence from Georgia after an armed 
struggle.10 
The application of IHL principles in these conflicts is vital 
for the protection of both governmental and liberation move-
ment combatants, and for civilians caught in the middle of a 
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POW registry at the Red Cross Museum in Geneva, Switzerland. 
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conflict zone. On a political level, national liberation movements 
often seek to apply IHL principles in their conflicts to legitimize 
their organization and cause on the international stage. If they 
are seen to act in accordance with international legal principles, 
states may view these movements as genuine and valid actors, 
rather than as “rebels” or “terrorists.” Such a perceived status 
change could ameliorate the plight of national liberation move-
ments and the people they represent, for example by helping 
them to receive international aid.
In recent times, actors in some self-determination conflicts 
have attempted to apply IHL principles in their conflicts, outside 
of the formal IHL framework. For example, since its foundation 
in 2000, an NGO called Geneva Call has promoted the engage-
ment of non-state armed groups with IHL. Through Geneva 
Call, a number of national liberation movements from all parts 
of the world, including the Polisario in the Western Sahara, the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines, the Kurdistan 
People’s Congress in Turkey, and the Kurdistan Regional 
Government in Iraq, have agreed to implement IHL principles in 
relation to the use of landmines.11 This break from the traditional 
IHL framework is necessary because, as illustrated below, this 
paradigm is state-centric, sidelining non-state actors.
ihl and non-state aCtors 
geneva conventions
The Geneva Conventions of 1949, the main IHL instru-
ments, are in principle open to ratification by states only. These 
instruments have been almost universally ratified and have been 
deemed to be part of customary law, thus binding on all states.12 
They contain two provisions regarding accession or acceptance 
that could be of use to national liberation movements and allow 
for the application of the Conventions to wars of national lib-
eration. The first provision is Common Article 60/59/139/155 
regarding accession, which states that accession is open to any 
“Power” rather than to any “State.”13 The second is Article 2(3), 
which also refers to “Powers” rather than “States” as entities that 
can be bound by the Geneva Conventions.14 If the terms “Power” 
or “Powers” in these two provisions can be taken to encompass 
national liberation movements, then these movements could 
accede to or accept to be bound by the Geneva Conventions, 
thus applying the whole corpus of IHL to wars of national lib-
eration. This liberal interpretation is not without its critics, who 
argue that the drafters originally intended the term “Power” to be 
restricted to mean states only.15 
Attempts have been made by non-universally recognized 
states, for example the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République 
Algérienne (Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria) 
and the State of Palestine,16 to accede to the Conventions and 
the Additional Protocols.17 However, these attempts were unsuc-
cessful as the Depositary housed in the Swiss government did 
not accept the Parties’ notification of accession as they were not 
recognized states.18 This illustrates that, even though the legal 
framework could potentially accommodate national liberation 
movements, political will is also needed in order to implement 
IHL in wars of national liberation.
additional protocol i
IHL was reviewed and revitalized by the adoption of two 
Additional Protocols at the Diplomatic Conference for the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian 
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts 1974–1977. Additional 
Protocol I19 deals with international armed conflicts and 
Additional Protocol II20 deals with non-international armed con-
flicts. These instruments have not been ratified by every state, 
but some provisions have been deemed to be part of customary 
law.21 As a result of international pressure during the decolo-
nization period, wars of national liberation were determined to 
be international armed conflicts and thus fall under Additional 
Protocol I.22 
Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I identifies as interna-
tional armed conflicts situations that “include armed conflicts 
in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and 
alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of 
their right of self-determination . . . .”23 The terms “colonial 
domination,” “alien occupation,” and “racist regimes” are not 
clarified in the instrument or elsewhere, but it is clear that they 
reflect the politics of the decolonization period. It may therefore 
be questioned whether Article 1(4) is applicable to modern 
wars of national liberation.24 Some more recent national libera-
tion movements, however, claim that their conflicts clearly fall 
within the remit of Article 1(4). One example is the Free Aceh 
National liberation movements often seek to apply IHL 
principles in their conflicts to legitimize their organization 
and cause on the international stage. If they are seen 
to act in accordance with international legal principles, 
states may view these movements as genuine and valid 
actors, rather than as “rebels” or “terrorists.”
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Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM)25 in the Acehnese 
region of Indonesia, which claimed that Indonesia is a neo-
colonist.26 The GAM fought a war for self-determination and 
independence from Indonesia for 25 years until it finally signed 
a peace agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding,27 with 
the Indonesian government in 2005, thereby giving up its claim 
to independence. Alien occupation “covers the situation of a 
territory which was not yet fully developed into a State before 
it came occupied by another State”28 and could apply to places 
such as the Western Sahara and events such as the Polisario’s 
current war of national liberation. A claim of alien occupation 
could perhaps also be made by groups representing the Kurdistan 
People’s Congress and the Kurdistan Regional Government in 
Turkey and Iraq. The category of “racist regime” is more dif-
ficult to satisfy in a current context. This term was originally 
directed towards the apartheid regimes of South Africa and the 
former Southern Rhodesia,29 which are no longer in existence. 
The General Assembly also commented that Zionism was a 
form of racism in Resolution 3379 (XXX) of 1957, but this was 
voided by Resolution 46/86 of 1991.30 
It is important to note that Article 1(4) states that interna-
tional armed conflicts “include armed conflicts in which peoples 
are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupa-
tion and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of 
self-determination . . . .”31 However, the Commentary on the 
Additional Protocol ignores the word “include” and the drafters 
stated that Article 1(4) “should be interpreted as introducing an 
exhaustive list of cases which are considered to form part of the 
situations covered by the preceding paragraph.”32
In short, it is clear that Article 1(4) has a restrictive scope,33 
as it only applies to situations of armed struggle by a people 
against colonial domination, alien occupation, or a racist regime. 
A second criterion of Article 1(4) is that the struggle of that 
people must be undertaken in order to exercise its right to self-
determination against a Contracting Party to the Protocol. This 
requirement further limits the scope of the provision, as the vast 
majority of states faced with such a struggle, such as Indonesia 
and India,34 have not ratified Additional Protocol I, thereby ren-
dering the protection offered by the instrument useless for many 
liberation movements.
Article 96(3) of Additional Protocol I,35 discussed further 
below, accommodates national liberation movements and allows 
for their accession to the instrument, but only when they follow 
specific procedural requirements which limits the application of 
the instrument. First, the prerequisites of Article 1(4) of Protocol 
I must be satisfied. Then the authority representing the people 
fighting for self-determination must make a Declaration to 
the Depositary, which then must notify the other Parties to the 
Geneva Conventions.36 The Declaration subsequently triggers 
the application of the Conventions and Protocol.37 
article 96(3) declarations
When Additional Protocol I was adopted, national liberation 
movements welcomed Article 96(3) in principle as an attempt 
to allow for their accession to an IHL instrument and for the 
regulation of their wars as international armed conflicts. Since 
then, a number of Article 96(3) Declarations have been made 
by national liberation movements, such as the African National 
Congress (ANC).38 However, no such Declarations are listed by 
the Depositary39 or have been transmitted to the High Contracting 
Parties.40 The Depositary will not accept Declarations made by 
national liberation movements in states that have not ratified 
Additional Protocol I, since such Declarations do not fulfill the 
procedural requirements of Article 96(3). Some Declarations of 
this kind, specifically mentioning Article 96(3), are nevertheless 
deposited with the ICRC,41 indicating that national liberation 
movements have recognized the difficulties inherent in Article 
96(3) and tried to work outside the formal framework. There 
is uncertainty regarding the legal status of such unilateral 
Declarations. Verhoeven has commented that “it is accepted 
that a declaration without deposition suffices”42 to trigger the 
application of the Conventions and the Protocol, although this 
assertion could be questioned in light of inconsistent practice.43 
The Article 96(3) Declaration system is referred to in Article 
7(4) of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use 
of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects44 of 1980 
(Certain Conventional Weapons or CCW). Under this provision, 
in situations covered by Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol 
I, an authority can make a Declaration to that Convention’s 
Depositary, the Secretary General of the United Nations. This 
would trigger the application of the Weapons Convention and 
its Protocols as well as the Geneva Conventions, even in cases 
where the state against which the authority is fighting has not 
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Women soldiers of the Free Aceh Movement.
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States almost always refuse to recognize the existence 
of national liberation movements and prefer to refer to 
groups who use force to challenge their authority as 
“rebels” or “terrorists” who fall outside the remit of  
IHL. Members of the Irish Republican Army who  
fought for the independence of Ireland from the United 
Kingdom called for many years for their members who 
had been imprisoned to be granted prisoner of war  
status; however, they were viewed only as “terrorists”  
and dealt with under domestic legislation.
ratified Additional Protocol I.45 However, no Declarations of this 
kind have been made.46 The fact that national liberation move-
ments have not utilized this mechanism may mean that these 
movements have become disillusioned with the formal IHL 
framework and the problems associated with accession to other 
IHL instruments. It may also mean that information on the CCW 
mechanism has not been widely disseminated among national 
liberation movements. Dissemination of IHL rules is the first 
step towards application and is an issue which deserves atten-
tion. Engagement with non-state actors is needed for adequate 
explanation of IHL principles to take place.
geneva call and tHe deed of commitment
Very important and innovative work to engage with and to 
accommodate non-state actors and to encourage their willingness 
to apply IHL has been undertaken by Geneva Call since 2000. 
Geneva Call is a “neutral and impartial humanitarian organi-
sation dedicated to engaging armed non-State actors towards 
compliance with the norms of international humanitarian law 
and human rights law.”47 It has accommodated the desire of 
non-state actors to bind themselves by IHL rules regarding land 
mines, through the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines 
and on their Destruction of 199748 (Ottawa Treaty). This is done 
by means of signing a Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a 
Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine 
Action,49 formulated and overseen by Geneva Call.
Although landmines are a popular weapon of non-state 
actors, the Ottawa Treaty limits ratification to states only and 
the use of these weapons by non-state actors cannot be formally 
regulated under the current IHL framework. By signing a Deed 
of Commitment, however, armed non-state actors agree to a 
number of commitments in relation to the non-use of mines and 
also agree to the monitoring and verification of these commit 
ments by Geneva Call. Under the Deed, signatories also agree 
“to treat their commitment as one step or part of a broader com-
mitment in principle to the ideal of humanitarian norms,”50 thus 
binding themselves in the most formal way possible within the 
current IHL framework. So far, 39 armed groups51 have signed 
Deeds of Commitment, a move that a number of states view as 
a positive development.52 
national liberation movements, states, and ihl
It is obvious that national liberation movements will be met 
with obstacles to their accession to the Geneva Conventions 
as they are not states.53 However, that does not stop them 
from declaring their intention to apply and be bound by these 
Conventions outside of the formal legal framework.54 For exam-
ple, the ANC made a statement to the ICRC in 1980 regarding 
its willingness to apply the Conventions, as did South West 
Africa People’s Organisation, and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic 
Republic.55 
In addition, since the outbreak of many wars of national 
liberation in the 1970s, numerous liberation movements have 
actively implemented IHL principles, especially in relation to 
prisoners of war. Some national liberation movements have 
invited the ICRC to visit their prisoner camps and to over-
see their implementation of IHL rules. The ICRC has visited 
prisoners of war held by the various national liberation move-
ments such as the Polisario Front,56 the National Front for the 
Liberation of Chad,57 and the SPLM/A58 to monitor their treat-
ment of prisoners and application of IHL. The ICRC has also 
encouraged dialogue between state leaders and national libera-
tion movements. For example, the president of the ICRC has met 
with President Al Bashir of Sudan and also with the chairman of 
the SPLM/A, John Garang de Mabior. During these meetings, 
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the ICRC president made known the ICRC’s readiness to facili-
tate the release of detainees held by the SPLM/A.59 
While national liberation movements have been willing to 
apply and to declare their intentions to apply IHL in an effort 
to “internationalize” and legitimize their struggles, states gen-
erally refrain from applying any IHL provisions for fear that 
they may be in some way legitimizing the national liberation 
movement and thus the challenge to their sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity.60 States almost always refuse to recognize the 
existence of national liberation movements and prefer to refer 
to groups who use force to challenge their authority as “rebels” 
or “terrorists” who fall outside the remit of IHL. Members of 
the Irish Republican Army who fought for the independence of 
Ireland from the United Kingdom called for many years for their 
members who had been imprisoned to be granted prisoner of war 
status; however, they were viewed only as “terrorists” and dealt 
with under domestic legislation.61 Similarly, the Indonesian 
government insisted for many years on officially calling the 
GAM a “peace disturbing gang” (gerombolan pengacau keama-
nanan),62 thereby denying its national liberation movement 
status, and applied domestic criminal law when dealing with 
GAM members.
Only very rarely, when violence and fighting have reached 
high levels, have states accepted that IHL applied to a war of 
national liberation and affirmatively applied Common Article 
3, the most basic of all IHL provisions. For example, beginning 
in 1974, Portugal applied Common Article 3 to the conflicts in 
its colonies in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique and 
invited the ICRC to visit its prisoners of war.63 France also 
applied the provision to the Algerian War in 1956, “partially 
because the FLN [National Liberation Front of Algeria] threat-
ened reprisals if executions of captured FLN members contin-
ued.”64 These are rare examples of state acknowledgement of 
application of IHL norms to internal conflicts, as states tend to 
favor territorial integrity over humanitarian concerns.65 
The fact that national liberation movements have invited the 
ICRC to overview their implementation of IHL principles in 
prisoner of war camps, have signed Deeds of Commitment to 
the Ottawa Treaty and restricted their use of landmines, and have 
been open to dialogue on IHL principles and processes with 
NGOs and states, illustrates their wish to be accommodated in 
the formal IHL framework. Currently, due to the state-centric 
nature of IHL, the adhesion of national liberation movements to 
this body of law is ad hoc and unpredictable. An IHL framework 
which formally engages these movements is needed.
ConClusions and reCommendations
Given the major difficulties that national liberation move-
ments have faced when attempting to bind themselves by IHL, 
the work of organizations such as Geneva Call should be wel-
comed. This work should also be expanded to include other IHL 
conventions. In addition, dialogue between states and non-state 
actors, as well as with international organizations, on issues 
of IHL should be encouraged to reflect the reality of current 
conflicts, which are rarely waged between two or more states. 
Attempts should be made to convince states that the application 
of IHL to a conflict does not necessarily translate into a threat 
to their territorial integrity. It is important that the benefits of 
the application of IHL and, indeed, the consequences of non-
compliance under international criminal law be highlighted. 
Such steps may encourage the political will necessary for the 
implementation of the IHL regime in wars of national liberation, 
which can only be to the benefit of all involved in the conflict.
HRB
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